Causal cognition in a non-human primate: field playback experiments with Diana monkeys by Zuberbühler, Klaus
Causal cognition in a non-human primate: ®eld
playback experiments with Diana monkeys
Klaus ZuberbuÈhlera,b,*
aMax-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Inselstrasse 22, D-04103 Leipzig, Germany
bCentre Suisse de Recherches Scienti®ques, TaõÈ Monkey Project, Abidjan, Ivory Coast
Abstract
Crested guinea fowls (Guttera pucherani) living in West African rainforests give alarm
calls to leopards (Panthera pardus) and sometimes humans (Homo sapiens), two main preda-
tors of sympatric Diana monkeys (Cercopithecus diana). When hearing these guinea fowl
alarm calls, Diana monkeys respond as if a leopard were present, suggesting that by default
the monkeys associate guinea fowl alarm calls with the presence of a leopard. To assess the
monkeys' level of causal understanding, I primed monkeys to the presence of either a leopard
or a human, before exposing them to playbacks of guinea fowl alarm calls. There were
signi®cant differences in the way leopard-primed groups and human-primed groups
responded to guinea fowl alarm calls, suggesting that the monkeys' response was not directly
driven by the alarm calls themselves but by the calls' underlying cause, i.e. the predator most
likely to have caused the calls. Results are discussed with respect to three possible cognitive
mechanisms ± associative learning, specialized learning programs, and causal reasoning ± that
could have led to causal knowledge in Diana monkeys. q 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All
rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Non-human primates respond to their own and other species' alarm calls in a way
that suggests that they have rather sophisticated knowledge of the calls' semantic
content (Seyfarth & Cheney, 1990; Seyfarth, Cheney & Marler, 1980; ZuberbuÈhler,
Cheney & Seyfarth, 1999a). West African Diana monkeys, for example, react to the
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leopard alarm calls of sympatric Campbell's guenons (Cercopithecus campbelli)
and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) as if they themselves have witnessed a leopard
as the cause for the alarm calls (ZuberbuÈhler, 2000a,b). From a comparative evolu-
tionary perspective, this behavioral pattern is of interest because it raises questions
about the capacity of non-human primates to perceive and perhaps understand the
causal relations underlying other individuals' behavior.
Research on causal understanding in non-humans has yielded mixed results. On
the one hand, causal reasoning seems to be a uniquely human trait (Tomasello,
1998). This becomes most evident when non-human primates are confronted with
problems in the physical domain: individuals experience severe dif®culties when
asked to solve simple technical problems requiring ± from a human perspective ±
only modest levels of causal understanding (e.g. Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994;
ZuberbuÈhler, Gygax, Harley & Kummer, 1996). Even chimpanzees need a surpris-
ingly large number of trials before they can reliably use a stick to gain a reward by
pushing it through a tube, thereby avoiding a mid-tube trap (Limongelli et al., 1995).
On the other hand, primates perform quite well when causal problems are introduced
through another individual's behavior rather than the physical interactions of inan-
imate objects. Premack and Premack (1994), for example, reported an experiment
with captive chimpanzees in which subjects ®rst observed how an apple and a
banana were hidden underneath two containers. After a brief distraction, the
chimp saw a trainer eating either an apple or a banana. When being allowed to
choose, it reliably selected the container with the fruit the trainer was not eating at
the moment.
Field playback studies provide additional evidence that non-human primates are
able to perceive causal relationships in the social domain. Cheney, Seyfarth and Silk
(1995), for example, have shown that free-ranging Chacma baboons (Papio cyno-
cephalus ursinus) may perceive or even recognize cause-effect relations in the
context of social interactions. In this species, dominance relationships are partially
mediated by two kinds of vocalizations, the `grunts' given by a female to lower-
ranking group members and the `fear barks' given to higher-ranking ones. Through
the use of a playback experiment, it was possible to show that causally inconsistent
call sequences ± a higher-ranking animal responding with fear barks to a lower-
ranking animal's grunts ± elicited stronger responses in recipients than control
sequences that were made causally consistent.
Kummer (1995) has proposed three different cognitive mechanisms that may
generate causal knowledge. First, causal knowledge can be the result of an associa-
tive learning process (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Knowledge of this kind is weak
and does not require any specialized cognitive abilities. The individual undergoes a
simple conditioning process through repeated exposures to a cause-effect relation-
ship, resulting in a learned association, for example, between the acoustic features of
an alarm call stimulus and the corresponding predator class. Second, causal knowl-
edge may be stronger due to the presence of specialized innate learning programs or
`causal detectors'. This cognitive mechanism is characterized by stimulus selectivity
and ef®ciency (often one-trial learning), a prominent example being taste aversion
learning in rats (Garcia, Ervom & Koelling, 1966). Considering the strong selective
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pressure that predation imposes and the limited learning possibilities animals have to
avoid it, it is conceivable that such specialized learning programs have also evolved
to guide antipredator behavior (e.g. Curio, Ernst & Veith, 1978). According to these
two learning hypotheses, the acoustic features of the alarm calls act as a surrogate or
substitute for a predator class which is ultimately driving the antipredator response
(e.g. Dickinson & Shanks, 1995, p. 22). Finally, causal knowledge may be the result
of a reasoning process similar to the process that underlies humans' responses to
surprising and unexpected events. In this case, causality problems are solved with an
understanding of how and why one event may lead to another, which allows recon-
struction of missing events in a causal sequence. Under this hypothesis, the
monkeys' response is not directly driven by the alarm call stimulus but by the
predator most likely to have caused the calls.
In this study, I examined Diana monkeys' ability to recognize the possible causes
of another species' alarm calls. When encountering ground predators, Diana
monkeys respond with two different antipredator strategies. To human poachers,
who hunt with weapons, monkeys typically produce a small number of alarm calls
followed by silent hiding in the forest canopy (ZuberbuÈhler, NoeÈ & Seyfarth, 1997).
To leopards, who hunt by stealth and surprise, individuals produce conspicuous
alarm calls at high rates, sometimes even approaching the predator until it moves
on and leaves the area (ZuberbuÈhler, Jenny & Bshary, 1999b). Crested guinea fowls,
a ground-dwelling gregarious bird species, typically give conspicuous alarm calls to
leopards and respond with silent ¯ight to humans (personal observation). When
actively chased by a human, however, guinea fowls may change their strategy
and give loud and conspicuous alarm calls as they do to leopards. Hence, when
hearing guinea fowl alarm calls, Diana monkeys cannot de®nitively identify the
reason why the birds have called. Instead, the monkeys have to respond to a causal
sequence with a missing and uncertain component, i.e. the actual predator that has
caused the birds to give alarm calls. To investigate how Diana monkeys respond to
this causal sequence I conducted two kinds of playback experiments.
The ®rst experiment investigated how Diana monkeys interpret the alarm call of
guinea fowls in the absence of any additional information. Different groups heard
playback of human speech, leopard growls, and the alarm calls of two species of
guinea fowls, while their vocal response was recorded at the same time. In the
second experiment, additional information about the predator present was provided
to disambiguate the causal sequence. Groups were primed with either human speech
or leopard growls to suggest the presence of one of the two predators. Five minutes
later, the same group heard guinea fowl alarm calls from the same location to
investigate whether monkeys were capable of establishing a causal connection
between the predator and the alarm calls. If the monkeys were able to take the
predator as the cause of the alarm calls, then their response to the alarm calls should
resemble their response to the predator. Alternatively, if the monkeys' causal knowl-
edge is simply based on a learned association between the alarm calls and, for
example, the presence of a leopard, then the response to the alarm calls should
remain constant and the priming history should have little effect on the monkeys'
behavior.
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2. Methods
2.1. Study site and subjects
Data were collected in the TaõÈ National Park, CoÃte d'Ivoire, between July 1994
and February 1999 in an approximately 50 km2 large area of primary rain forest
surrounding the CRE research station (58 50 0 N, 78 21 0 W). Diana monkey groups
consist of one adult male and several adult females with their offspring. The average
home range size of a group has been estimated to be about 0.5 km2 (HoÈner, Leumann
& NoeÈ, 1997), with the females defending the group's range against neighbors (Hill,
1994). Based on these data, I estimated the Diana monkey population in the study
area to consist of at least 50 different groups. To avoid dependencies in the data, I
never tested a particular group more than once with a particular playback stimulus
unless trials were separated by at least 1 year. This level of independence was
obtained by testing a group only if it was located at least 1 km (i.e. two home
range diameters) away from any previously conducted trial of the same series.
2.2. Playback stimuli
The playback stimuli were broadcast with a Sony WMD6C Professional Walk-
man connected to a Nagra DSM speaker-ampli®er. The vocal response of the
monkeys to the playback stimuli was tape-recorded with the Sony WMD6C or
TCM5000EV recorders in combination with a Sennheiser ME80 directional micro-
phone. The following recordings were used as playback stimuli: (i) the alarm calls of
crested guinea fowls, (ii) the alarm calls of helmeted guinea fowls (Numida meleab-
ris), (iii) the growls of a leopard, and (iv) the speech of a human. Helmeted guinea
fowls occur in Savannah habitats throughout Africa but are not found in rain forests
(Brown, Urban & Newman, 1982). Because the alarm calls of this species resemble
that of crested guinea fowls in their acoustic features they were thought to be
suitable as a control stimulus for a semantically unknown alarm call played from
the ground. Fig. 1 depicts spectrographic representations of the guinea fowl alarm
calls used as stimuli. Spectrograms of leopard growls and human speech sounds used
as playback stimuli have been published elsewhere (e.g. ZuberbuÈhler et al., 1997).
2.3. Frequency (kHz)
Stimuli were presented as natural series of about 15 s duration. Leopard growls
and helmeted guinea fowl alarm calls were purchased from the National Sound
Archive, London. Crested guinea fowl vocalizations and human speech sound
were recorded in the study area. I assumed that wild Diana monkeys could recognize
the calls of their predators. This assumption seems warranted given a number of
playback studies that have documented predator recognition in non-human primates
(e.g. Hauser & Wrangham, 1990; NoeÈ & Bshary, 1997; ZuberbuÈhler et al., 1997).
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2.4. Diana Monkey vocal behavior
Male alarm calls consist of very loud and low-pitched syllables that differ in the
acoustic structure depending on whether the males encounter a crowned-hawk eagle
(Stephanoaetus coronatus) or a leopard (ZuberbuÈhler, 2000c). To their other two
predators, chimpanzee and humans, the males typically remain silent. Adult females
also produce distinct alarm calls to leopards and crowned-hawk eagles but these
calls differ in their acoustic structure from those of the males (ZuberbuÈhler et al.,
1997). When detecting chimpanzees or humans, females give a small number of soft
alert calls before becoming silent for prolonged periods (ZuberbuÈhler, 2000a).
2.5. Procedure
In conducting playback experiments, I systematically searched the study area
until I located a Diana monkey group. To ensure that my presence did not distort
the monkeys' behavior, each group's vocal behavior was monitored for about 15
min prior to an experiment, while visual contact was avoided completely. A play-
back trial was initiated if no alarm calls were given during that period and no
monkey had detected me. The speaker was positioned at an elevation of about 2
m from the ground and at a distance of about 50 m from the group, outside of the
monkeys' visual range. Recordings of the subjects' vocal behavior began 5 min
Fig. 1. Spectrographic representations of the playback stimuli used. (Top) Alarm calls of the crested
guinea fowl; (bottom) alarm calls of the helmeted guinea fowl (x-axis indicates time in seconds, y-axis
indicates frequency in kHz).
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before the ®rst playback stimulus and lasted for 15 min. In all cases, sample sizes
indicate the number of groups tested.
3. Results
3.1. Experiment 1: vocal responses to predators and guinea fowl alarm calls
When hearing crested guinea fowl alarm calls Diana monkeys responded as if a
leopard were present (Fig. 2). There were no signi®cant differences between the
monkeys' vocal response to crested guinea fowl alarm calls and leopard growls
(Mann±Whitney U-test, two-tailed, NGF  13, NL  12; overall call rate,
z  1:687, P , 0:1; female leopard alarm calls, z  0:274, P . 0:7; male leopard
alarm calls, z  0:847, P . 0:3). However, monkeys did not simply respond with
leopard alarm calls to any disturbance from the ground. There were signi®cant
differences between the responses to crested guinea fowl alarm calls and human
speech (NGF  13, NH  15; overall call rate, z  3:686, P , 0:001; female leopard
alarm calls, z  3:528, P , 0:001; male leopard alarm calls, z  4:209, P , 0:001).
Signi®cant differences were also found between the monkeys' response to the alarm
calls of crested guinea fowl and the alarm calls of allopatric helmeted guinea fowl
Fig. 2. Median vocal response of Diana monkey groups to predators and guinea fowl alarm calls.
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(NGF  13, NheGF  10; overall call rate, z  3:724, P , 0:001; female leopard
alarms, z  3:026, P , 0:003; male leopard alarm calls, z  3:532, P , 0:001).
3.2. Experiment 2: vocal responses to different causes of guinea fowl alarm calls
In experiment 1, Diana monkeys responded to crested guinea fowl alarm calls as
if a leopard were present (Fig. 2). This could be the result of (1) a learned association
between the alarm calls and leopards or (2) a cognitive process that allowed the
monkeys to respond to the leopard as the most probable cause of the birds' alarm
calls. To distinguish between these two hypotheses, monkeys were primed with
playback of either human speech or leopard growls and then tested with guinea
fowl alarm calls or leopard growls 5 min later from the same location.
Monkeys responded with a signi®cantly lower call rate to guinea fowl alarm calls
when primed with human speech than when primed with leopard growls (Mann±
Whitney U-test, two-tailed, NH  15, NL  12, z  2:615, P , 0:009, Fig. 3). The
number of leopard alarm calls produced, however, did not separate the two groups:
in only one out of 15 cases (6.7%) did monkeys (male or female) produce leopard
alarm calls to guinea fowl alarm calls after being primed with human speech.
Similarly, groups primed with leopard growls produced leopard alarm calls to
guinea fowls in only three out of 12 cases (25.0%). No signi®cant differences
were found in the number of female leopard alarm calls (z  1:421, P . 0:1) or
male leopard alarm calls (z  1:584, P . 0:1) to guinea fowl alarm calls between
human-primed and leopard-primed groups. This paralleled the behavior of control
groups primed and re-tested with leopard growls, where females produced leopard
alarm calls in only one out of 11 cases (9.1%) to the second leopard playback.
3.3. An alternative explanation
When Diana monkeys heard the alarm calls of crested guinea fowl in the absence
of any other stimuli, they gave leopard alarm calls. In other words, they responded as
if they assumed that a leopard was nearby. When Diana monkeys heard the alarm
calls of crested guinea fowl after being primed with (and responding to) the growls
of a leopard, they typically gave no more leopard alarms but responded with loud
alerting calls (Fig. 3). In other words, they responded as if the leopard growl had
already informed them that a leopard was nearby and the guinea fowl alarm calls,
once again indicating the presence of a leopard, provided redundant information.
Finally, when Diana monkeys heard the alarm calls of crested guinea fowl after
being primed with (and responding to) the voices of humans, they typically gave no
leopard alarms and signi®cantly fewer loud alerting calls; that is, they largely
remained silent. In other words, they responded as if the sound of humans `overrode'
the usual information conveyed by guinea fowl alarms and indicated that humans,
not a leopard, were nearby.
Alternatively, one could argue that monkeys did not take humans or leopards as
the cause of guinea fowl alarm calls but that priming with human speech simply
elicited long-term cryptic behavior to any subsequent stimulus, regardless of the
7
Fig. 3. Diana monkey responses to guinea fowl alarm calls and leopard growls after having been primed
with either human speech (a) or leopard growls (b).
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underlying causality. If this hypothesis is correct, then the following two predictions
can be made.
First, if human speech sound causes long-lasting cryptic behavior, then human-
primed groups should respond weakly to any other subsequent stimulus, including,
for example, leopard growls. There should be no signi®cant differences, therefore,
between human-primed groups responding to leopard growls and human-primed
groups responding to guinea fowl alarm calls. However, this was not the case.
Priming with human speech had little effect on the subsequent response to leopard
growls (Fig. 3). Instead, signi®cant differences were found between human-primed
groups tested with leopard growls and tested with guinea fowl alarm calls (Mann±
Whitney U-test, two-tailed, NH-L  14, NH-GF  15; overall call rate, z  2:842,
P , 0:005; female leopard alarm calls, z  2:328, P , 0:02; male leopard alarm
calls, z  2:267, P , 0:03). No signi®cant differences were found, however,
between leopard-primed groups tested with leopard growls and with guinea fowl
alarm calls (Fig. 3; Mann±Whitney U-test, two-tailed, NL-L  11, NL-GF  12;
overall call rate, z  1:232, P . 0:2; female leopard alarm calls, z  0:932,
P . 0:3; male leopard alarm calls, z  0:181, P . 0:8).
Second, in the TaõÈ National Park there is substantial variation in poaching pres-
sure. Monkey groups with a home range in the research area located east of the CRE
research station (`habituated groups') are reasonably well protected against human
predation and exposed daily to human speech by researchers, assistants, and other
people passing by. Most other groups, however, live in less protected areas and
suffer from various degrees of poaching pressure (`unhabituated groups'). Given
this, there should be a signi®cant difference in how habituated and unhabituated
groups are affected by playback of human speech. To habituated groups, human
presence is not a predatory threat and priming with human speech should not cause
any cryptic behavior nor should it affect the monkeys' response to subsequent guinea
fowl alarm calls. To unhabituated groups, however, human presence is highly
dangerous and priming with human speech should elicit cryptic antipredator beha-
vior.
If the associative account is correct and the monkeys' response is simply the result
of a learned association between guinea fowl alarm calls and leopard presence, then
priming with human speech should have opposing effects on habituated and unha-
bituated groups in the way they respond to guinea fowl alarm calls. Habituated
groups (who are not afraid of humans and therefore do not respond with cryptic
behavior) should respond to guinea fowl alarm calls as if a leopard were present (i.e.
give a large number of leopard alarm calls and general alert calls). In contrast,
unhabituated groups (who are afraid of humans and therefore respond with cryptic
behavior) should continue to respond cryptically to guinea fowl alarm calls because
of the danger of human presence.
If monkeys respond to the causal reason of guinea fowl alarm calls, however, then
no differences are predicted in the way habituated and unhabituated groups respond
to guinea fowl alarm calls in the presence of humans. Consistent with the second
hypothesis, habituated groups showed little response to guinea fowl alarm calls
when primed with playback of human speech sounds. No signi®cant differences
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were found in the vocal behavior of habituated and unhabituated groups (Mann±
Whitney U-test, two-tailed, Nhab  5, Nunhab  15; overall call rate, z  0:308,
P . 0:7; female leopard alarm calls, z  0:577, P . 0:5; male leopard alarm
calls, z  0:577, P . 0:5), suggesting that the monkeys' weak response to guinea
fowl was not due to overall cryptic behavior caused by human speech.
4. Discussion
If Diana monkeys hear the alarm calls of crested guinea fowls in the absence of
additional information, they respond as if a leopard is present (Fig. 2). This is not
simply the result of Diana monkeys responding with leopard alarm calls to any
conspicuous alarm calls coming from the ground: the alarm calls of helmeted guinea
fowl cause a response that resembles the monkeys' response to humans, not
leopards. This response pattern raises questions about the nature of the underlying
cognitive mechanism driving the monkeys' response. According to a ®rst hypoth-
esis, monkeys rely on a learned association between a conditioned stimulus, the
guinea fowl alarm calls, and an unconditioned stimulus, the leopard. According to a
second hypothesis, monkeys attend to the most likely cause of the alarm calls, i.e.
the presence of a leopard.
Behavioristic accounts of cognitive phenomena, as outlined in the ®rst hypothesis,
are generally dif®cult to reject (e.g. Shanks & Dickinson, 1987), typically because
(1) one can always think of a way the animal has solved the problem with an
elaborate chain of associations and (2) in wild animals little is known about their
previous natural experiences with the experimental stimuli. Since associative
accounts are typically considered to be more parsimonious, the following three
sets of data are at least consistent with the second hypothesis.
First, priming with playback of human speech causes the monkeys to produce a
signi®cantly lower call rate to guinea fowl alarm calls than no priming or priming
with leopard growls. Human-primed groups respond to guinea fowl alarm calls like
groups responding to human speech, suggesting that monkeys interpreted the alarm
calls as human-caused (Figs. 2 and 3). The number of leopard alarm calls given to
both human speech and human-primed guinea fowl was very low and no statistical
differences were found. This could have been the result of two different mechanisms
with the same outcome since groups primed and tested with leopard growls also
exhibit a low tendency to produce leopard alarm calls to the second stimulus (Fig. 3)
(ZuberbuÈhler et al., 1999a).
Second, the cryptic response to guinea fowl alarm calls of human-primed groups
was not due to general cryptic behavior caused by the prime. This is because human-
primed groups respond signi®cantly stronger when tested with leopard growls
instead of guinea fowl alarm calls.
Third, habituated monkey groups where human speech does not induce cryptic
behavior nevertheless show little response to guinea fowl alarm calls, suggesting
that monkeys responded to the fact that humans were the most likely cause for the
guinea fowl alarm calls.
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So far, the focus has been on the predator±prey relationship between guinea fowls
and two of their predators but nothing has been said about the relationship between
humans and leopards. Leopards are hunted by poachers and consequently avoid
human presence (Jenny, 1996; Martin, 1991). One could argue, therefore, that
monkeys know about this and that human priming not only informs them about
the presence of humans, but also informs them that a leopard will no longer attack
and is likely to leave the area (J. Call, pers. commun.). This is a plausible scenario
with the following consequences. If monkeys have simply associated guinea fowl
alarm calls with the presence of a leopard and the calls act as a substitute for a
leopard, then one would not predict a difference in the vocal response of human-
primed groups to either leopard growls or guinea fowl alarm calls. Although human
priming, according to this hypothesis, lowers the risk of a leopard attack both stimuli
simply indicate the presence of a leopard and no response differences are predicted.
Fig. 3 shows that this was not the case. Human-primed groups respond signi®cantly
weaker to guinea fowl alarm calls than to leopard growls, indicating that even
though the chances of a leopard attack might be reduced in the presence of humans,
monkeys respond differently to the two stimuli.
Data show, therefore, that the monkeys' response to another species' alarm calls is
not the result of a one-to-one association between two types of stimuli, i.e. the
guinea fowl alarm calls and the leopard, despite what Fig. 2 suggests. Instead, it
seems that monkeys are able to respond ¯exibly to alarm calls as a function of their
eliciting cause. However, can one conclude from these data that monkeys truly
understand the causality underlying guinea fowl alarm calls? Understanding caus-
ality requires knowledge of the laws that describe the relation between events, that
is, how and why one event may lead to another. When humans have to solve similar
problems in which only the outcome of a process but not its cause are presented they
reconstruct the missing events through a mental process termed `causal reasoning'.
Causal reasoning produces a strong form of causal knowledge because here the
individual can access and combine different sources of existing knowledge in
order to solve a novel problem, even without ever having encountered it before
(Kummer, 1995). The experiments presented here can only give an incomplete
account of how Diana monkeys could have solved the causal problem. This is
mainly because nothing is known about the previous experiences monkeys have
had with guinea fowl alarm calls and the presence of particular predators. The
crucial information, i.e. how often groups have witnessed encounters between
alarm calling guinea fowls and human poachers, is unknown. A laboratory study
would be necessary at this point to clarify the matter. If a causal reasoning process
underlies the monkeys' response, then the following needs to be the case. (1)
Monkeys must have knowledge that guinea fowl alarm calls can be caused by
various disturbances, such as leopards or chimpanzees. (2) Monkeys must have
knowledge that the best response to human poachers is to respond with cryptic
behavior. (3) When hearing guinea fowl alarm calls in the presence of humans for
the ®rst time, monkeys must be able to combine these two sets of information and
respond with cryptic behavior even though they normally respond with leopard
alarm calls to this stimulus. Although with the data presented in this paper little
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can be said in favor or against the causal-reasoning hypothesis, the monkeys' beha-
vior strongly contrasts with associatively learned weak causal knowledge. Subjects
have shown that they can ¯exibly assign two different behavioral responses to the
same alarm call stimulus, depending on the causal information they have received.
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